This research aims to analyze the revision structure of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and assess its consequences on strengthening or limiting popular sovereignty. The Constitution, as the fundamental document regulating power relations and guaranteeing the principles of democracy, not only provides the possibility of adapting to social and political developments through its revision mechanism, but can also be a tool for strengthening the role of the people in governance or, conversely, a mechanism for limiting public participation and oversight. Therefore, the central issue of the research is to what extent the review structure envisaged in the Iranian Constitution - especially in the form of Article 177 - works towards the realization of popular sovereignty and what legal, political and institutional factors can push this mechanism towards limiting or expanding the role of the people. The research findings show that although the Iranian Constitution ostensibly foresees public participation through the election of members of the Assembly of Experts, the concentration of the initiative stage and the final approval of the review in the hands of non-elected institutions essentially pushes the process towards a "top-down" model. The lack of provision for a referendum to initiate or approve reforms, the lack of possibility for civil society institutions to participate in the process, severe restrictions on the scope of issues subject to review, and the relatively closed structure of the review stages are among the factors that reduce the capacity to ensure popular sovereignty.